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Abstract 
Governments worldwide are searching for innovative procurement systems, such as Public-
Private-Partnership (PPP), Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), and their variations, which can help 
materialize construction projects effectively, and thus truly deliver values to the society. With the 
success of these procurement systems in some projects, they have been introduced as innovations 
to other jurisdictions. However, current doctrine of procurement systems abounds with “one-way 
lecturing” without considering the jurisdictions’ particular Political, Economic, Social, 
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Technological, Environmental, and Legal (PESTEL) contexts. This research attempts to shed 
light on procurement innovation by skeptically examining two state-of-the-art procurement 
systems, an agent-construction system (ACS or in Chinese Dai Jian Zhi) and PPP, in China, with 
special consideration given to its particular and peculiar PESTEL background. It does so by 
using content analyses, semi-structured interviews, and a “PESTEL-Procurement Innovation” 
framework. It is found that PPP and its real instances have not received their popularity as 
expected, while the ACS, which is little known to the international construction management 
fraternity, is widespread in China. The study of ACS and PPP further reveals that congruence 
between a procurement system and its external PESTEL conditions is essential for procurement 
innovation. The “PESTEL-Procurement Innovation” framework could be a useful tool for 
devising procurement innovation although its many questions are yet to be answered by further 
research. 
 
Keyword: Procurement innovation, Agent-Construction System, Public-Private-Partnership, 
Construction procurement, China 
 
Introduction 
In the course of procuring public construction projects, no matter whether it is in developing or 
developed worlds, there have been widespread problems discovered such as cost overrun, late 
delivery, overstaffed organizations, and low efficiency (Latham, 1994; Egan, 1998; Egan, 2002; 
Bresnen and Marshall, 2000; Dubois and Gadde, 2002). To address these problems, governments 
worldwide are searching for innovative procurement approaches that can help procure projects in 
a more efficient way and thus truly deliver values to the society. The often-discussed approaches 
include, inter alia, Private-Public-Partnership (PPP), Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), and their 
variations. It is generally observed that there are two trends in these innovative procurement 
approaches. Firstly, public procurement is shifting from traditional state-led approaches to 
partnering between public and private sectors (Godfrey, 1996; Egan, 1998; Savas, 2000; Winch, 
2000; Egan, 2002; Chan et al., 2003; Cheung et al., 2003). Secondly, integrated approaches are 
adopted to reduce the fragmentation and discontinuity by which the construction sector has long 
been plagued (Anderson et al., 2000; Cheung et al., 2010; Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Evbuomwan 
and Anumba, 1998; Leiringer and Green, 2006; Baiden et al., 2006). Together with the trends is 
the systems view to construction procurement which emphasizes a procurement system including 
elements such as contract strategy, culture (e.g. trust and institutions), and finance, should 
deserve more attention of the construction and project management fraternity (Rowlinson, 1999).  
 
With the success of these procurement systems in some projects, they have been introduced to 
other jurisdictions as innovations for procuring new projects (e.g. Wang and Tiong, 2009; Li et 
al. 2005). Nonetheless, prevailing doctrine of procurement systems seems being disconnected 
with the recipient’s Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal 
(PESTEL) backgrounds. “One size does not fit all”; a procurement system growing from a 
certain PESTEL background may not be of full applicability to others with different PESTEL 
settings. Adopting them slavishly may cause loss or even failure of a project. Likewise, 
Kumaraswamy (1994) discussed the appropriateness of developed countries’ procurement 
systems when applied to less-developed countries and argues that a sustainable and synergistic 
procurement strategy must be developed in such situations. It thus behooves the construction and 
project management fraternity to further look into a procurement system, and to shed lights on 
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how to devise innovative systems that can truly fit with a given PESTEL setting.  
 
Notably, China is keen to introduce innovative procurement systems that can help tackle the 
ingrained problems in its construction sector, such as cost overrun, late delivery and poor quality. 
The challenge is even more acute in the face of the exponentially increased complexity 
associated with the huge demand of facilities driven by its unprecedented urbanization plan. 
According to National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, the total fixed-asset investment 
reached 22,486 billion Yuan in 2009, making the government as the biggest client (NBS, 2010). 
The strategic imperative to materialize this huge demand by adopting effective procurement 
methods is apparent. After decades’ continuous evolvement, an Agent-Construction System 
(ACS or in Chinese Dai Jian Zhi) is now widely adopted in the procurement of public projects. 
For example, 11 out of 31 new construction projects for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games were 
carried out by using ACS (Project Management Union, 2010). By contrast, PPP and its real 
instances such as BOT and PFI are still stagnant in China irrespective of the overwhelming 
discussions that have been directed towards them. Why the two innovative systems have 
different destinies? It is intriguing to examine the two procurement systems in China, with the 
hope that procurement innovation can be better understood by putting them into China’s 
particular PESTEL context.  
 
The aim of this research is to shed light on procurement innovation by skeptically examining 
ACS and PPP within China’s PESTEL background. The main proposition is that congruence 
between a procurement system and its external PESTEL conditions is essential for procurement 
innovation. The remainder of this paper is structured into three sections. Firstly, research design 
and methods are described – this is comprised of intensive content analyses of existing literature 
and interviews with practitioners by following an analytic framework. Secondly, discussions are 
conducted to elucidate the two key concepts: ACS and PPP, by connecting them to China’s 
PESTEL context. Research findings are presented in this section. Finally, key conclusions are 
drawn together. The research provides useful insights into procurement innovation, particularly 
when governments worldwide are searching for innovative procurement systems to help deliver 
public projects and services.  
 
Theoretical framework and research methods 
The basic premise in this paper is that a procurement system should be skeptically examined in 
terms of its suitability to a certain PESTEL setting. This is not entirely new; it can be 
retrospectively linked to an earlier line of thought in the research works which investigated 
procurement systems in a social-technical framework (e.g. McDermott and Jaggar, 1991; 
McDermott, 1996; Newcombe, 1994). This is also in accord with “systems thinking” which 
came into vogue across a wide range of areas including procurement in construction. In line with 
this thought, construction procurement was deemed to be an open system that dynamically 
interacts with its external environment (Rowlinson, 1999). The PESTEL, standing for Political, 
Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, and Legal, is a framework of macro-
environmental factors that are normally used as an environmental scanning component 
in strategic management. In comparison with the social-technical framework, the construct of 
PESTEL adopted here, provides a wider framework through which the different macro-
environmental factors and their impacts on a procurement system can be thoroughly examined. 
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Secondly, another construct, the innovativeness of a procurement system can be analyzed by 
following a framework contributed by Hughes et al. (2006). They suggest a conceptual way of 
distinguishing the various procurement methods from the following six aspects: (1) ownership, 
initiation and funding, e.g. owner-financed, public sector-financed, developer financed, PFI; (2) 
selection method, e.g. negotiation, partnering, frameworks, selective competition, open 
competition; (3) price basis, e.g. work and materials as defined by bills of quantity, whole 
building, a fully-maintained facility, performance; (4) responsibility for design, e.g. architect, 
engineer, contractor, in-house design teams; (5) responsibility for management, e.g. client, lead 
designer, principal contractor, JV; (6) amount of sub-contracting, e.g. 0-100%. In addition to 
these aspects, (7) risk allocation and reward is critical for the success of a procurement system, 
and thus it was also adopted for analyses. Innovation could take place in one or more of the 
aspects. By integrating the PESTEL and the aspects of innovativeness of a procurement system, 
a new analytic framework, named “PESTEL-Procurement Innovation” can be derived, as shown 
in Fig. 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1 The “PESTEL – Procurement Innovation” framework for understanding procurement 
innovation in construction 
Bearing in mind the analytic framework, the authors investigated three streams of literature: 
Chinese PESTEL background for procurement, ACS, and PPP in China. The past three decades 
have witnessed a gradual yet fundamental evolvement of the PESTEL background and a plethora 
of literature can be identified. For PPP, there is also plenty of literature in books, journal papers, 
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and reports (e.g. Akintoye et al., 2003a; Kumaraswamy and Morris, 2002; Shen et al., 2002), 
which provide a good basis for understanding it although not all works have paid due attentions 
to the PESTEL background. In total, 149 papers, articles, and books hit the target in search for 
the literature relating to PPP and 39 are particularly relevant to China. For ACS, there are three 
prevailing books (Zhang, 2008, Yin and Yan, 2006, Hou, 2006). The understanding of ACS was 
triangulated by a body of 64 articles published on different journals but organized under a 
Project Manager Union (2010) website. Archived papers, presentations and in particular keynote 
speeches by governmental officers in the First National Summit on “Agent-Construction System: 
theories and practices” provide very useful literature for this study. The search of the literature 
was further enhanced by using a China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database for 
research papers. At the end, the body of literature on ACS comprised of 102 articles. 
 
A literature survey using content analysis was conducted to understand the three sets of literature. 
The method of content analysis, often included under the general rubric of “qualitative analysis,” 
is a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content 
categories based on explicit rules of coding (Stemler 2001). It enables the researcher to include 
large amounts of textual information and systematically identify its properties. In analyzing the 
literature on Chinese macro-environment for construction procurement, the PESTEL itself can 
serve as a coding scheme (Miles and Huberman, 1994), but time dimension was added. The 
analyses of this part of literature can be illustrated in Fig. 2. Key milestones in this evolvement 
were identified as the footnote on the time axis to understand the major changes which can be 
categorized into the PESTEL taxonomy. Human coders (the authors) were used in this content 
analysis. Over the past decade, the authors have closely monitored this evolvement in their 
research and teaching. Their prior knowledge certainly facilitated this analysis. Content analyses 
were also conducted to understand ACS in China. In view of the many variations of ACS, the 
first challenge is to understand it, and generate a generic model if that is possible. Next, analyses 
were centered on the evaluation of its innovativeness by following the inner part of the analytic 
framework as shown in Fig. 1. The third step is to relate the innovativeness, if any, to the 
external PESTEL environment. Given that ACS was not created over night, the analyses have 
been connected to the Fig. 2 which has a time dimension. Similarly, the content analysis 
approach was applied to the literature of PPP. The ACS literature is in Chinese while other 
literature, including procurement systems and PPP, is in English. This presents a possibility that 
information will be lost in the translation but it also provides a chance for cross referencing the 
information by perusing it in two languages. To reduce the potential bias underlying the content 
analyses, the coding process was conducted by two of the authors. Agreement of the coded 
contents has to be made through a lot of interactions between the two coders. This literature 
survey took 5 weeks’ intensive work. 
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Fig. 2 Milestones of PESTEL evolvement for public construction procurement in China 
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Through the literature survey, the three subject areas, namely, PESTEL environment for 
construction procurement, ACS, and PPP are elucidated respectively. However, the latent 
meaning and implications, in particular the connection between the procurement systems and 
their macro-environment, are not apparent. The next stage of this research thus adopted interview 
as the main method for interpreting ACS and PPP in China. Interviews allow for an in-depth 
analysis of the two procurement systems. Fifteen interviews have been conducted over a 
relatively long period from December of 2009 to July of 2011. The basic information of the 
interviewees can be seen from Table 1. They can be roughly categorized into three groups, which 
are main parties involving in a procurement system: (a) government officers from the 
procurement policy side, (b) practitioners acting as clients, financiers, or contractors of 
construction projects, and (c) scholars in the field of construction procurement. Each interview 
started with a brief introduction of this research project. Interviewees were then encouraged to 
discuss the two procurement systems with three basic questions: (i) pros; (ii) cons; and (iii) why 
it was adopted? The last question enables us to link the procurement systems with the PESTEL 
backdrop against which they have been initiated. Altogether, the questions allow for an 
evaluation of the congruence between the two constructs. The time for interviews lasted from 40 
to 60 minutes. All interviews were recorded and transcribed for future analyses. Content analysis 
was applied again to triangulate the understanding from the previous literature survey with the 
data from the interviews. The two parts of data will be indicated differently, e.g. to use a 
referencing system for the former, while using italic fonts for the latter. However, the two sets of 
data were triangulated and delineated together to ensure an uninterrupted reading journey in 
understanding the PESTEL, Procurement Innovation, and their nexus. 
 
Table 1 Basic information of the interviewees 
Code Description Languag
e 
Cod
e 
Description Languag
e 
Code Description Language
1 CEO of an English 
international company 
English 6 Government investment 
officer in a Works Bureau 
Mandarin 11 Professor in a 
department of 
construction and real 
estate, Nanjing, 
China 
Mandarin
2 Vice President for 
International Business of a 
SOE in Hong Kong 
Cantones
e 
7 Government officer from a 
provincial Development and 
Reform Commission 
Mandarin 12 Asso. Professor in a 
department of 
construction 
management, 
Tianjin, China 
Mandarin
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3 Director for International 
Business of a SOE based in 
Beijing 
Mandarin 8 Government officer from a 
provincial Development and 
Reform Commission 
Mandarin 13 Professor in a 
department of 
construction and real 
estate, Beijing 
Mandarin
4 General manager of a 
collective construction 
enterprise listed in Hong Kong 
Mandarin 9 Officer from a government 
project investment company 
Mandarin 14 Associate professor 
in a department of 
engineering  
management, 
Chongqing 
Mandarin
5 General manager of a 
collective construction 
enterprise based in Guangdong 
Mandarin 10 Government officer from the 
State Development and 
Reform Commission 
Mandarin 15 Professor in a 
department of 
construction and real 
estate, Hong Kong 
Mandarin
 
 
Analyses, discussions, and findings 
 
General PESTEL Background for project procurement in China 
China is known as a socialist country adopting a Marxism-Leninism ideology, based on which a 
centrally planned economy system has been developed. Since 1979 when the country adopted the 
“open-door” policy, China has been reformed from the traditional planned economy to a market 
economy. Gradually, economic activities and factors of production are configured by the market 
as “the invisible hand” instead of a central plan. Whilst Western economists argue that these two 
are not natural partners, it is generally accepted in China that “government planning and market 
regulating are two integral parts of the socialist market economic system”. It should allow the 
market to allocate factors of production and to increase efficiency while the central planning is 
indispensable in ensuring healthy development of the whole economy. Although the market is 
now dominant, the whole economy system still has a strong “planning” culture. For example, the 
economic goals have been achieved through its “Five-Year Plans”, which are a series 
of economic development initiatives shaped by the National People’s Congress to map strategies 
for economic development, set growth targets, and launch reforms. As a result of a series of 
economy reforms, China has kept a remarkable economic growth for the last two decades. 
According to the world development indicators released by the World Bank, from 1989 to 2010 
China's average quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth was 9.31%, reaching a 
nominal GDP of $5.87 trillion in 2010, becoming the world's second largest economy after 
the United States.  
 
Intertwined with the political and economic development is an unprecedented urbanization, 
which is as much a social process as it is an economic and territorial process. Urbanization has 
been the major drivers of China’s GDP growth over the past decades and it will become even 
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more so over the next 20 years. It is adopted as the major policy for dealing with the remarkable 
disparities between China’s urban and rural development, solving the tough problems of 
Agriculture, Rural Areas, and Farmers (also San Nong Problems in Chinese), and achieving a 
compatible development of urban and rural areas (NDRC 2005). According to the UN World 
Urbanization Prospects (UN, 2009), the level of urbanization in China is 46.1%, with a 
population of 620 million living in urban areas, while this level will be 73.2% in 2050 and the 
urban population will be 1 billion. A McKinsey report (2009) even forecasted that 1 billion 
people will live in China’s cities early in 2030, and 5 billion m2 of road will be paved, 170 mass-
transit systems could be built, and 40 billion m2 of floor space will be built in 5 million buildings 
by 2025. These have been reflected in China’s fixed-asset investment on property, roads, and 
other infrastructures to sustain the economic growth as well as its urbanization ambition. 
Urbanization has significantly impacts on public project procurement, although the real effects 
on the society at large (e.g. demographic change, and demand for social infrastructure) are yet to 
be fully seen in China. 
 
At a strategic level, there is a “rejuvenating China country through science and education” 
signifying the importance of technological development in China. According to the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2010), the R&D investment in China is 99.59 billion Yuan in 2009, 
3.9 times that of year 2000. Many writers stress the need to raise the level of technological 
development of the construction industries of developing countries (Ofori, 1994). R&D, as an 
indicator of this technological development, is perceived as impetus to sustain growth in the 
Chinese construction sector. However, the NBS (2010) statistics show that the R&D investment 
in the construction sector is 166.6 million yuan in 2009, taking only 0.17% of the nation’s total 
R&D. Another characteristic is the imbalance development in various construction technologies. 
On the one hand, Chinese engineers can solve most difficult technical problems in the world, 
such as the ones in Three Gorge Project, and Qinhai-Tibet Railway project. On the other hand, it 
still demands advanced technologies from outside. The industrial long-time prosperity coincides 
with an unfailing inflow of foreign investment, advanced technologies and managerial 
approaches from developed countries (Ling et al. 2005). For technological sophisticated 
construction projects, technology is still a significant criterion for awarding contracts in China 
(Shen et al., 2006; Lu, 2006).  
 
Environmental consideration is emerging as another notable factor in construction procurement. 
This, on the one hand, is because construction by nature has compelling reasons to deal with 
environment. Researchers have suggested that construction products such as buildings are the 
major energy consumer, e.g. accounted for 38.9% of total U.S. energy consumption in 2005 
(EPA, 2009). The construction and demolition waste is the major pollutants, e.g. accounted for 
23% of the total municipal solid waste in Hong Kong (EPD, 2005). On the other hand, the 
Chinese industries, including construction, are notorious in terms of their energy efficiency and 
carbon emission. China’s economic development come at a significant environment cost. China 
is now the world largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs), responsible for over 20% of 
annual CO2 emissions from the burning fossil fuels (CGTR, 2009). For example, China produced 
about 44% of the world's cement in 2006, and cement production produces more carbon 
emissions than any other industrial process, accounting for around 4% of global carbon 
emissions (The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2006). The China National 
Accounting Study Report published in 2006 calculated that the economic loss caused by 
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environment pollution in China was RMB511.8 billion. According to the recently approved 12th 
Five-Year Plan covering 2011 to 2015, China has targeted that energy intensity by 2015 will 
improve by 18% from 2010 level and non-fossil fuel energy will increase to 11.4% of the total 
generation. Environment is set to be one of the corner stones for initiating and procuring 
construction in China. 
  
Several studies (e.g. Chen, 1998; Lam and Chen, 2004) have narrated the development of a legal 
system in China, with special considerations given to its construction sector. Guided by a 
national strategy called “ruling the country by law” since 1997, the development of a civil law 
system has sped up in China, although its problems such as fragmentation of regulatory 
authorities, ambiguity in legal drafting (Lam and Chen, 2004) are yet to be dealt with. A 
construction legal system consisting of the laws and regulations at three levels is in presence. 
However, truly ruling the country by law is yet to be in vogue in China, with no exception of its 
construction sector. One explanation, according to Trade Council of Denmark, is the cultural 
traditions and norms rooted in Confucianism. Researchers have reported that Chinese tend to 
using guanxi to subvert the formal system. Combating corruption is an enduring challenge ahead.  
 
The above general PESTEL background, by no mean an exhaustive description, is characterized 
by in high-speed transition, which presents extra uncertainties and challenges to construction 
procurement in China. The situation has been further exacerbated by internal and external factors 
such as globalization, entry to WTO, financial crises, and climate change. Under this 
circumstance, the paramount importance to materialize the huge demand of construction in 
China using effective procurement methods is apparent. 
 
Public Project procurement in China  
Based on the content analyses of the literature, a genealogy of typical government public 
procurement systems adopted in China over the past decades can be drawn. 
 
Centrally planned economy (1949-1978) 
For building projects, (a) self-build model, in which public entities (i.e. a university, or a 
hospital), more precisely, their internal project organizations, are fully in charge of the 
projects. They define project scopes, obtain approval from government, and procure the 
projects by themselves;  
 
For infrastructure projects, (b) Government construction commanding unit model, in which a 
temporary governmental unit was set up to command the procurement of a given project, e.g. 
a road committed by a local government. The unit may neither have professional experiences 
in construction nor be responsible for budgets or construction time. The project will be 
transferred to end users after completion. Another model (c) State-owned construction 
enterprises (SOEs) model was also popular, particularly for materialising the national-level 
infrastructure projects. For example, for Ministry of Railway (MOR), Ministry of 
Transportation (MOT), Ministry of Construction (MOC), they all had their affiliated SOEs in 
charge of the materialisation of specific types of projects (i.e. railway, road infrastructure). 
Particularly, the model in MOR is so ingrained that it was even extended to today, which 
stands accused of the recent appalling Wenzhou high-speed train crash leading to 40 deaths.  
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Economic transition period (1979-2000) 
For building projects, the self-build model was still dominant.  
 
For infrastructure projects, (d) the legal person model was introduced and became popular, in 
which a project company will be set up as a legal entity to take charge of the procurement 
and also the operation of a public project.  
 
Post transition period (2001 - ) 
Public projects were classified into two categories: (i) non-profit-making, i.e. urban roads, 
schools, hospitals, libraries, museums, government offices, Olympic Games stadiums, and (ii) 
profit-making utilities, i.e. water, gas, telecom, sewage facilities, tolling roads, bridges and 
tunnels.   
 
For non-profit-making projects, (e) Agent-construction system (ACS) was introduced as the 
main procurement system since 2004 when a regulation named Circulars on Investment 
Modes Reform (hereafter the Circulars) was promulgated by the Chinese State Council. 
For profit-making projects, (f) Public-Private Partnership (PPP) was also encouraged in the 
Circulars in 2004 while the (d) legal person model was still popular, particularly when the 
project is mainly funded by government.  
 
The following sections will focus on the two recent procurement systems: (e) ACS and (f) PPP, 
in China’s PESTEL contexts. 
 
Agent-Construction System (ACS or Dai Jian Zhi) 
The main background for introducing ACS was that problems in the public construction 
procurement such as cost overrun, late delivery and poor quality were ubiquitously discovered; 
they have reached to a point that more effective systems have to be introduced. For example, 
poor quality cases in public projects were reported every now and then, i.e. Rainbow Bridge 
Collapse in Chongqing (People’s Daily Online, 1999), Phoenix Bridge Collapse in Hunan 
Province (XinhuaNet, 2007), and JiaShao Bridge Collapse in Zhejiang Province (DEMOTIX, 
2010), caused the death of 40, 64, and 2 respectively, and more injured. Construction in China 
probably can be ranked as the second most dangerous industry, right after its mining industry. A 
more ingrained problem is the cost overrun prevalent in procuring public projects, ranging from 
provincial projects, i.e. Shi’an Highway Project in Hebei Province (Yin, 2008) to prestigious 
national projects, i.e. Beijing National Stadium (Pennay, 2009). There are some notorious 
“phishing projects” which were set up at a low budget to get endorsement but then gradually 
enlarge the project scope and seek extra investment from government. The problems were 
ascribed to the outdated investment modes and chaotic relationships amongst the parties, which 
were deeply rooted in the old PESTEL background. The 2004 Circular and ACS were 
introduced to solve the problems. 
 
It is generally agreed that ACS was firstly piloted in Xiamen in 1993 and introduced nationwide 
in 2004. The term firstly appeared in the Circulars in which it was stated that “for procuring 
government investment non-profit-making projects, professional construction management units 
are selected through competitive bidding and tendering to conduct the construction projects, to 
control project cost, quality, and time, and to turn over the projects to the future users or 
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operators after they are successfully constructed.” Fig. 3 illustrates the relationships amongst the 
parties involved in ACS. A construction management unit (CMU) is selected by the government 
investment body as an agent to undertake a certain or all stages of construction projects, i.e. 
feasibility study, design, contracting, construction and handover after completion, meanwhile to 
strictly control project cost, quality and time. The CMU receives a fee plus some previously 
agreed incentive bonus for the professional service it rendered. ACS, therefore, is considered as 
the construction management (CM) system originated in the U.S. by many researchers (e.g. Yi, 
2006) as well as our interviewees. This view places an emphasis on that the CMUs, which 
possess more professional knowledge than the government investment body or end users, can 
help overcome the problems in procuring public projects. 
 
 
Fig. 3  The relationships of government, construction agents, contractors, and end users in 
Agent-Construction System 
 
The Circular only addressed a general principle (Yan et al., 2009), while applicable procurement 
systems are subject to detailed elaborations by individual provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities. For example, the government investment body as shown in Fig. 2 could be 
provincial Development and Reform Commissions (DRC) themselves (e.g. in Beijing), or their 
authorized institutions (i.e. in Shanghai Chengtou Corporation as a professional industrial 
investment group company engaged in the construction and operation of the city’s infrastructure 
facilities), or ender users (i.e. the model in Chongqing). According to Zhang (2008), the last 
mode should not be regarded as ACS. The professional CMUs could be professional project 
management companies which are complete legal entities, or extended government executive 
arms (e.g. Bureau of Public Works in Shenzhen). With different combinations of government 
investment bodies and CMUs, a variety of procurement options are generated and all claimed to 
be ACS. Yin (2008) summarized there are three models of ACS in China: Beijing Model 
consisting of Beijing DRC as the investor and professional CMUs as the construction agent, 
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Shanghai Model with project investment corporation and professional CMUs, and Shenzhen 
Model with government as the investor and the Works Bureau as the agent. 
 
There emerges a new form of ACS which is probably more familiar to the international 
construction management researchers and practitioners alike. Some SOEs, with their relatively 
strong financing, architecture, engineering, and construction capabilities, acted as government’s 
agents in procuring projects. They work with government and undertake financing, architecture, 
engineering, and construction of a project. Instead of operating it for a long period of time, the 
project will be completely purchased back by the Government after 2 to 5 years. By ways of 
example, companies like China State Construction, and Vanke are now building low-rent or 
public-rent houses for the Chinese government through this specific ACS model, which can be 
perceived as the Building and Transfer (BT) or turnkey model. 
 
Although there is no consensus on what ACS is, it has become a widespread procurement system 
for government investment non-profit-making public projects in China. According to Yan et al. 
(2009), by the end of 2008, 45 out of 47 regions including provinces, municipalities and special 
provincial-level cities in the Mainland China have issued their guidelines on how to conduct the 
ACS in line with the Circular. In many regions, ACS has been made as a mandatory system, 
while in other the system is promulgated with greater flexibility. According to Yin (2008), by the 
end of 2005, there were 153 completed, 164 ongoing, and 85 planned projects adopting ACS. 
The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Committee also adopted this procurement system to carry out 
11 out of 31 its newly built stadium projects. 
 
By following the “PESTEL-Procurement Innovation” framework, the innovativeness of ACS 
and its link with the macro-environment can be examined:  
 
Ownership, initiation and funding: The adoption of ACS has not changed the fact that the public 
sector is dominant in initiating, funding, and owning public projects. On the contrary, it aims to 
solve the problems of public procurement in China, through streamlining the unclearly defined 
rights, responsibilities, and relationships amongst government (as both a market regulator and a 
client), project deliverers (state-owned or private enterprises), and end users. In this model, an 
end user will seek project endorsement from the government investment body. The CMUs, on 
behalf of the government, will execute the project and transfer it to the user. An interviewee, 
who is a government officer, reflected that: 
Through this way, it is hoped that budget overrun can be reduced since end users 
can no longer enlarge project scope arbitrarily and have a finger in the budget. 
The loopholes such as the “phishing projects” can hopefully be closed.  
An academic interviewee comment cynically:  
While integrated procurement approaches in other economy advocate more 
considerations for end users, this ACS tries to limit their bad influence on a project.  
 
Selection method: ACS clearly stated that competitive bidding and tendering will be adopted in 
the selection of construction agents. However, this has not been fully implemented in some 
forms of ACS, for example, the Shenzhen model.  
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Responsibilities for design and management: ACS is superior to other traditional procurement 
systems (e.g. Design, Bid, and Building, DBB) for shifting the design and management from 
government or its executive arms to professional CMUs. It is believed that through professional 
design and management the problems of budget overrun, poor quality, and late delivery can be 
circumvented. Government, on the other hand, can focus on regulating efficient market rules 
instead of managing individual projects.  
 
Price basis and sub-contracting: The issues were left to the professional CMUs or the private 
contractors. The much-denounced excessive subcontracting problem has not been addressed in 
these procurement systems. It is still possible that construction works will be subcontracted to 
different levels of contractors and thus problems associated such as risks, safety, and low quality 
remain a serious concern.  
 
Risk sharing mechanism: The ACS, particularly for the forms similar to the BT or turnkey 
models, creates a win-win situation by considering the risks bored by each party. A CEO, whose 
company has successfully undertaken a road project in Jiangxi province, reflected in our 
interview that:  
We were approached by the government. It is straightforward. We signed the contract, not 
a very complex one. We are state-owned company and we have mutual trust with 
government. We built the road and afterwards the government paid us fully in one go.  
In answering our question about the rationale for the government to adopt the model, he 
elaborated: 
In this project, the government has secured the project budget from NPC. They got the 
money. But they used this BT model. An officer told me that they still saved money 
after paid the cost and the bonus; using traditional design, bid, and build (DBB) 
model is doom to be budget overrun.  
However, it is not clear why the government had the incentive to save money. Interestingly, the 
interviewee gave other cases: 
Sometimes a local government may not have enough money to develop urban 
infrastructure, such as the road we just mentioned. But they have to develop it so they 
can sell land to real estate developers for a better price. Otherwise the local economy 
will be caught in a vicious circle. (As a non-Chinese CEO, he may not be aware of the 
1994 tax system). Under this circumstance, a local government will adopt ACS. After 
2-5 years, the government may have collected enough money to pay the road. 
He further elaborated:  
Instead of 30 years as some forms of PPP have promised, 2-5 years is a reasonable 
period for handling the risks by both the governments and ourselves. You know, 
everything is changing very fast in China.  
 
In summary, the innovativeness of ACS mainly lies in two areas. First, it endeavors to streamline 
the chaotic rights, responsibilities, and relationships amongst government, project deliverers, and 
end users. Secondly, it provides a reasonable risk sharing and reward allocation mechanism in a 
business environment where macro-environment factors are in high-speed transition. The system 
was created indigenously in China to deal with its particular and peculiar PESTEL setting. Thus, 
congruence between the system and its PESTEL setting is relatively high. This congruence will 
be further explored by examining Public-Private Partnership in China. 
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Public-Private Partnership in China 
Public-Private partnership (PPP) has been loosely defined and thus led to varying interpretations. 
In the U.S. the National Council for PPP defines it as “a contractual arrangement between a 
public sector agency and a private sector entity. Through this agreement, the skills and assets of 
each sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the 
general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards 
potential in the delivery of the service and/or facility”. In Canada, PPP was defined as a 
“corporative venture between the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, 
which best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, 
risks and rewards”. Li and Akintoye (2003) conducted a comprehensive review of the concept of 
PPP and concluded that “the numbers and types of PPPs are overwhelming, making the 
definition of a PPP difficult”. Notably, according to the definition of PPP in UK, “PPP should be 
broad such that even the informal dialogues between government officials and local community-
based organizations should be included”. Taking this broad perspective, PPP as a concept has 
been existing for long; traditional delivery models, either for profit-making projects or not, have 
involved the private sectors (e.g. private contractors) already (Godfrey, 1996). What is new is to 
place more emphases on partnership in the face of widespread criticisms of a low-trust culture 
embedded in the traditional procurement systems. Cowan et al. (1992) stressed that partnering is 
a philosophy; it represents a commitment of respect, trust, cooperation, and excellence for all 
stakeholders. If we accept this wide definition of PPP, for the time being, without doubt the ACS 
introduced above can be treated as one form of PPP. 
 
There is another body of PPP literature emphasizing the private sector, in particular, its financial 
resources and expertise in undertaking and operating projects. This narrow definition is also the 
author’s take on PPP in this study. Linking back to the “PESTEL-Procurement Innovation” 
framework, the innovativeness of PPP, by and large, lies in almost every aspect ranging from 
ownership initiation and funding through to risk and reward allocation. It is expected that the 
private sector will be more actively involved in public projects to improve efficiency and deliver 
value (HM Treasury, 2000; Allen, 2001; Ernst & Young, 2002; Akintoye et al., 2003b). Based 
on this premise, a series of integrated procurement systems (IPS) such as Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT), Private Finance Initiative (PFI), or Design-Building-Financing-Operating (DBFO), and 
their variations, have been devised. Fig. 4 illustrates a comparison of total investment and private 
participation investment (PPI) in infrastructure in China. Although merely emphasizing private 
finance cannot reflect the philosophy of PPP, it provides a measurable criterion to investigate the 
involvement of the private sector in public procurement. The data for total investment is from 
China Statistics yearbooks, and the data for PPI is derived from the PPI Project Database by the 
World Bank Group. The two sets of data are mainly for utilities such as energy, telecom, 
transport, water and sewerage. Irrespective of the datasets being actually compiled from different 
sources, some meaningful comparisons can be made by following the “PESTEL-Procurement 
Innovation” framework.  
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Fig.4  PPI and Total Investment in Four Sectors of Fixed Assets in China, 1990-2009 (Unit: 
US$ million) 
 
Firstly, PPP and its real instances such as BOT and PFI are not as widespread as expected in 
spite of the overwhelming discussions that have been directed towards them. This is probably 
owing to the government’s preference. As mentioned previously, China has a strong central plan 
culture in procuring public projects. For project financing, the Government can use central 
government allocations, retained tax revenues, SOE revenues, local bank debt, or World Bank 
soft loans (Wang and Tiong, 2009). Unlike some governments which became insolvent for any 
reason, China adopts a centralized strategy to raise finance for fix-asset investment through 
taxation, indicated by the 1994 tax reform. Although it is stated in the 2004 Circular that various 
kinds of financing vehicles should be encouraged, it seems that the Government is not keen to 
introduce private finance. This is resonated with the English CEO, by emphasizing that his 
company is still doing traditional contracting business in Hong Kong and China, commented that: 
The promotion of PFI in UK has its particular background. They need the 
participation from private sector. The situation is different here in Hong Kong or 
Mainland China. The Hong Kong government got the money. It is also about local 
politics which I haven’t fully captured. As long as all these factors are existing, PFI 
wouldn’t happen widely here in Hong Kong or in Mainland China. 
An interviewee of this study, who is a government officer responsible for public project 
investment, might be a representative of this mind-set by manifesting: 
For some window-dressing projects, we may adopt BOT or PPP. But for the projects 
that matter the national economy and livelihood of the people, government should 
dominate.  
In interpreting the “window-dressing”, the temptation is to say that the government is to maintain 
an open image, but there is no way to substantiate it. Nonetheless, it is clever to open a window 
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to these PPP projects so as to accumulate experience and keep abreast of their development. An 
interviewee from academia argued: 
Why should less popularity of PPP be perceived as a big problem? If a government 
can raise sufficient capital for its public projects, why have to go to expensive private 
finance? The big issue is to devise innovative procurements that can make public 
procurement more efficient and truly deliver values to the society.  
 
From a political point of view, PPP is not a highly favorable option in China. It is particularly 
true when PPP is arguably perceived as the disguised privatization (Rowlinson and McDermott, 
1999), which is still a sensitive topic in China. Privatisation generally improves the output and 
efficiency of the organisations that are privatized (OECD, 2003). Notably, for improving the 
efficiency there was a socialization and modernization of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
1990s. Privatization, a trend clearly witnessed in other Western countries over the past half 
century, has not been widely seen in China. On the contrary, there is a controversial recent 
phenomenon described as “State-Owned Enters and Private- or Collective-Owned Retreats” or 
“Guo Jin Min Tui”, where giant state-owned enterprises (SOEs) edge ahead of their private 
counterparts in many areas of the national economy.  
 
In parallel with this is another form of PPP – Public-Public Partnership in China (Wang and 
Tiong, 2009). In recent years, many SOEs are becoming more active in delivering public projects, 
either profit-making or not. These SOEs are the public sector in effect although they operate as 
real companies responsible for their own gains and losses. Their senior management is appointed 
by the Central Government through the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission. The properties of the public sector and SOEs make themselves trust each other by 
nature, an essential factor for the success of PPP (Cowan et al. 1992; Akintoye et al., 2003a). In 
addition, a reasonable risk sharing mechanism should be devised to reinforce this trust (Ke et al., 
2010). This Public-Public Partnership is expected to gain momentum in China, particularly in the 
face of the unprecedented urbanization and the social impacts it caused. Irrespective of the 
centralized project financing strategy, an interviewee reflected that  
This (PPP) will become more popular owing to the demand and supply: (a) 
provincial governments will be short of fund to sustain existing infrastructure 
development when their current financing strategy through selling land to real 
estate developers is widely criticized, and (b) SOEs, with its relatively excessive 
cash in hand, need to find proper investment channels. 
 
The support of PPP in the forms of legislations and policies fluctuated with the political, 
economic, and social development. For example, the Government changed the PPP policy and 
there is no more return of investment guarantee from government (The Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation, 1995). Irrespective of the Opinion of the State Council 
Regarding Encouraging and Supporting the Development of Non-state-owned Economy 
promulgated in 2005, Cheng and Wang (2009) reported that there is a fragmented regulatory 
regime, and the approval process for a PPP project is cumbersome. In view of the policy 
uncertainty and its associated risks, private capitals such as foreign equity, debt, institutional 
investors, and foreign commercial banks hesitate to enter this market.  
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However, in line with the environmental and technical change, there are some emerging niche 
markets for a closer partnership between the public and private sectors.  In view of the serious 
environment degradation, the ongoing 12th FYP (covering 2011 -2015) has set to reduce carbon 
emission 18% of GDP output. Development of low carbon cities is one of the most preferred 
decarbonizing strategies. China is proactively engaging international calibrations in 
implementing the strategies. For example, EU and China set a low carbon zone development 
agreement to promote low carbon economy growth in 2008 (Chatham House and E3G, 2008). 
PPP and its variations have also been adopted in many technically or managerially sophisticated 
projects. For example, PPP is more preferred in power projects and water projects. The private 
sector, in particular foreign companies, shows competitive advantages by using their expertise in 
undertaking and operating these projects.  
In summary, PPP and its real instances, as procurement innovation, have not travelled smoothly 
in China without contenders. Without a dearth of capital, the Central Government seems not 
keen to embrace private finance on the one hand. Owing to the various risks and political issues, 
private capitals hesitate to venture into this market on the other. The destiny of PPP in China is 
mainly related to its PESTEL conditions which are less conducive to the flourish of PPP. It again 
proves that congruence between a procurement system and its external PESTEL conditions is 
essential for procurement innovation. 
 
Conclusions 
Problems in procuring public projects in China are mainly caused by its chaotic definition of 
rights, obligations, and relationship amongst involved parties. ACS presents a certain degree of 
innovativeness in two main aspects: (a) clearly defined rights, obligations, and relationship; and 
(b) appropriate allocation of resources and risks amongst involved parties. It is widely adopted in 
China. Comparatively, PPP and its instances such as BOT and PFI have not received their 
popularity as expected. On the one hand, without a short of capital, the Central Government 
seems not keen to embrace private finance. On the other hand, private capitals hesitate to venture 
into this market mainly because of the various risks and political issues in China. The different 
destiny of the two innovative procurement systems is understandable – in comparison with ACS 
which grows from an indigenous PESTEL background, PPP is more intrusive. 
Furthermore, the cases of ACS and PPP from China suggest that a fit between a procurement 
system and its external PESTEL conditions is essential for the system as a key to realize public 
projects and truly deliver values to the society. Simply replanting a procurement system, in spite 
of its innovative in one economy, may not guarantee its effectiveness in another. “One-way 
lecturing” is futile to devise bona fide procurement innovations but sharing of experiences in 
different economies with different PESTEL conditions can encourage policy makers, 
practitioners, and researchers to pay due attention to the fit.  
 
Although the “PESTEL-Procurement Innovation” framework exhorts the connection between 
procurement innovation and its external PESTEL conditions, there are many questions waiting 
for further research. For example, how the two constructs interact with each other is not clear. 
Will a certain PESTEL background catalyze procurement innovation? Will an innovation in 
procurement take place by passively adapting itself to the PESTEL background or can it change 
PESTEL in an active way? Can the systems view, which has been proved as sensible to 
construction procurement, be of further help in making sense of the interaction between 
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procurement innovation and its external background? 
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